•When journalistic objectivity is attacked today for "producing not neutrality but superficiality"' for forcing reporters to balance "the remarks of a wise men with those of a fooP, the writers are flaying but a shadow of the original concept During its brief moment in the sun, objectivity was viewed not as something simple-minded and pallidly neutral, but as a demanding, intellectually rigorous procedure holding the best hope for social change.
In today's attacks on objectivity, no one seems to have sought out its birthplace or checked into its parentage. That may be because writers have assumed that objectivity equates with neutrality. The assumption is understandable. As used today, the two terms probably are interchangeable.
But objectivity once meant more than mere neutrality, as can be seen by going back to the 1920s and watching its birth. A general reading of the trade magazines, Newspaperdom and The Joumalist, from the 1890s into the 20th century demonstrates that the word objectivity was not yet in the vocabulary of workaday journnalists or media commentators. Instead, they used the words unbiased and uncolored. To one interested in journalistic currents and practices, the omission raised questions: When did journalists begin to apply the word objective to their work? What meaning did they give it? What arguments did they make for its adoption as a journalistic norm?
Those questions led to a search for the word. The results were rewarding, if somewhat puzzling. The reward came in joining a vigorous debate of the 1920s on problems of journalism and problems of democracy. If one listens to the voices that first called for the objective approach to news writing, one learns that modern critics are missing the message. Whatever objectivity may mean now, it had a particular and important meaning at its outset, a meaning created to cope with objective reporting in a specific way. The author was Nelson Antrim Crawford, and his work will be discussed at length later.
In turning to the definition of the word, it is important to understand that objectivity was a child of its time and a creature of its culture. It was inevitable that it should be discussed in the 1920s, the question only was, with how much vigor and to what result? For the decade of the 1920s saw the flourishing of scientific naturalism, a school of thought holding that there are no a priori truths, that attempts to explain the universe in metaphysical terms foster not understanding but ignorance and superstition, and that only knowledge gained by scientific investigation is valid/ As social scientists talked excitedly about harnessing the scientific methodology to their subject matter, it was inevitable that some thinkers would urge harnessing the new social science techniques to journalism. The term objectivity described this effort. In its original sense, objectivity meant finding the truth through the rigorous methodology of the scientist.
Such methodology was the central tenet of faith of the social scientists ofthe 1920s. It is inscribed in stone over the entryway ofthe social science building at the University of Chicago, dedicated in 1929: "When you cannot measure your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory."' And it was written on paper by a whole school of new social scientists: "Science begins when man learns to measure his world or any part of it by definite objective standards."'This, as will be seen, was the approach urged for journalism by some signtficant figures in the 1920s. They did not see the system as sterile; instead it was viewed as a counter to dangerous forces that threatened to undermine democracy, both in its practice and its theoretical framework.
The cultural attitudes and forces that together created the call for an objective journalism can be summarized as follows:
-A distrust of human nature and of people's inclination to gather facts before making judgments. This doubt stemmed from the work in psychology by men like John B. Watson and Sigmund Freud.
-A realization that even if the humans were fact-gatherers and users, propagandists were manipulating facts and clouding issues, making the "facts" delivered by the press a tainted commodity, thus tainting public opinion.
-A realization that if people did not, in actual practice, use facts in making judgments and tf they failed to get a trustworthy supply of facts anyway, then democracy as traditionally defined was deeply flawed: The omnicompetent citizen-ruler was a myth, as was the idea that the truth would win out in the end--A belief that the scientific method, applied to human affairs (including journalism) via the comparatively new social sciences (chiefly sociology, psychology, political science and economics) could open the door to human betterment.
Giving urgency to all the foregoing was the jingoistic, America-first mood of the country and its press just after World War I. Objectivity An expansion of the points just enumerated will help in understanding how objecdvity became the hope of many intellectuals of the 19208. Intellectual historians say the onset of World War I chastened the optimistic outlook of the intellectual progressives, who, in its aftermath, began to focus on the darker side of the facts being uncovered by the sciendsts and the social scientists. The assumptions of the progress of the human race fell before the new ideas.
Psychology stood at the forefront. John B. Watson, the father ofthe behavioral school of psychology, was a major influence. He denied that man had an inner nature, let alone any divine spark or soul. Watson defined the hollow man, one who is merely a product of his culture."
Add to this view the ideas of Freud: Man was at center irradonal; his actions must be explained not by reason but by his unconscious drives." As a young intellectual, Walter Lippmann (who will play the central role in this essay) was excited by the ideas of Freud, but saw at once that such a view of human motivation challenged some basic ideas of man-as-voter. On reading Freud in 1912, Lippmann wrote to a friend, "Its polidcal applicadons have hardly begun, though there are a few stray articles here and there."" With Lippmann as one of the leaders, more and more ardcles and books were to come, including many dealing with the problems raised for democratic theory and the role of the press as informer and shaper of public opinion. For the findings of the psychologists -and the gradual secularization of public debates -had undermined the philosophical foundation supporting the First Amendment. The concept of free speech had rested on a notion that, in the end, truth will win out over falsehood. In 1644, John Milton had been among the first to say it: "Let her (Truth) and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter."'* By the time of the American Revolution, this durable quality of truth was a given, and it had so remained into the 20th Century. A free press should be allowed so that truth could get into the field of battle, and a free press could be allowed because the falsehood that would certainly enter too would be too weak to cause harm. But if the ideas of the psychologists were valid, then most of the assumpdons underlying the belief were invalid.
To Milton, for instance. Truth came to earth directly from God, and its discovery by men was part of God's plan ("Truth indeed came once into the world with her Divine Master"'*). Once thinkers discarded the idea of a divine plan for mankind, that much of the argument became dust.
In Milton's world, also, truth was strong because humans were both radonal animals and moral ones. Thus, they were able to intuit moral truths and rationally determine other ones. While Milton's sectarian view of religion faded with time, the idea of divinely given intuition did not. For instance, traces of Ralph Waldo Emerson's Transcendentalism ("We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its truth...'** can be found in a 1922 editorial by the famous Kansas journalist, William Allen White: "...folly will die of its own poison and wisdom will survive... It is the proof of man's kinship with God."" But by the definition of the intellectuals of the 1920s, such ideas did not stand the test of objective analysis. The human race was neither allied to the truth through a kinship with God nor was a fully rational fact-gatherer. Instead, human beings saw things as they were stereotyped for them by their culture, and were moved to make conclusions based on their emotions, prejudices and desires. Thus truth was no better armed than falsehood in any public grappling. Its status was summarized with cynical certitude by psychology professor Albert T. Poffenberger of Columbia University in 1925. "The truth,' he wrote, "is not a primary factor in determining belief." Instead, belief is determined by "feeling and emotion" and by "desire." "We believe what we want to believe," he concluded." In his 1922 book. Public Opinion, Lippmann applies that belief to the American system of government:
It is no longer possible, for example, to believe in the original dogma of democracy, that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart.. It has been demonstrated that we cannot rely on intuition, conscience, or the accidents oi casual opinion if we are to deal with the world beyond our reach."
Without such reliance that truth will win out in a free marketplace of ideas, attention focused on the market itself. And there, the intellectuals found that the contents were tainted by propaganda. During World War I, propagandists, harnessing the new psychology, had been activeand successful -in marshaling public opinion. That success "had brought psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists to a new emphasis on human irrationality and the manipulative procedures employed by dominant social groups."Î n 1922, Lippmann observed that "persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government." This new "knowledge of how to create consent," he wrote, "will alter every political calculation and modify every political premise."*'
The fear that industrial and government publicists, working through a press with a capitalistic bias, were poisoning the wells of information pervaded media discussion in the 1920s. John Dewey, probably the leading intellectual of the time, stated flatly that through the publicity agent "sentiment can be manufactured by mass methods for almost any person or any cause."" 
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JOURNAUSM QUARTERLY Truly, the view of the 1920s had moved a long way from the Jeffersonian view of U\e omnicompetent citizen, the one who could and would gather facts and who was further graced with the mysteriout (and probabV God-given) ability to intuit truth. Now the citizen had no way of intuiting truth -he was only a creature of his culture. He was not a fact gatherer and user. Propagandists, using symbols, could play on his emotional nature. And publicists could control and taint what few facts he might use in arriving at an opinion.
As Iippmann wrote in 1922, The practice of demoaacy has turned a corner."^ The concerns were not academic ones: They were ^xirred l>y the Red Scare of 1919 and 1920. In a setting of labor unrest and anarchist violence, the country reacted with "hysteria and superpatriotism."** In a single night in 1920, U\e government arrested more than 4,(XX) persons suspected of being communists.*Î n response, Iippmann -who termed the period "a reign of terrorâ nd "the blackest reaction our generation has known""-wrote a set of essays central to this study. For those essays, published under the tide. Liberty and the News, contained the blueprint for objective reporting. In them, Iippmann concentrated on press performance, not on die competence of the readers. Concerned that the press was whipping up a jingoistic right-wing fever in the country, Lippmann wrote that "under the influence of headlines and panicky print, the contafiion of unreason can easily spread through a settled coniniunity."" Lippmann argued that public opinion is formed by propaganda aeated by special interest groups and that govermnent "tends to operate by the impact of controlled opinion upon administration."" Thus, the sources forming public opinion must be accurate. Making them so was "the baac problem of democracy." Everything else depends upon it. Without protection, «gainst propaganda, without standards of evidence, without criteria of emphasis, the living subsUnce of all popular decision is exposed to every prejudice and to infinite exploitation."
He then sets down the training for a new sort of journalist In doing so he forms what is apparenUy the original definition of objective journalism.
With this increase of prestige must go a professional training in journalism in which the ideal of objective testimony is cardinal. The cynicism of the trade needs to be abandoned, for the true patterns of the journalistic apprentice are not the slick persons who scoop the news, but the patient and fearless men of science who have labored to see what the world really is. It does not matter that the news is not susceptible of mathematical statement. In fact,_ just because news is complex and slippery, good reporting requires the exerdse of the highest of scientific virtues. They are the habits of ascribing no more credit bility to a statement than it warrants, a nice sense of the probabilities, and a keen understanding of the quantitative importance of particular facts." Ljppmann's use of the words objective, science, and scientific are significant. Adapting the scientific method to human affairs -including journalism -was central to the thought of the decade. As Lippmann wrote, "Only the discipline of a modernized logic can open the door to reality."" "Reality," to Lippmann, meant radical social change. Objective reporting, as he envisioned it, would not create a passive justification for the status quo, as is often assumed now. Those advancing the idea of applying scientific methods to human affairs -in all areas, not just journalism-^were political liberals. They attempted to create a system of values using the scientific method, borrowing from the philosophy of pragmatism expounded by William James and its variant, instrumentalism, set forth by John Dewey.
Dewey argued that the practical consequences of believing in an idea should determine its value.^The concept -an important one to grasp if one is to understand the impetus behind the creation of the theory of press objectivity-was stated well by Harold D. Lasswell, a leading political scientist:
...those who commit themselves to human dignity, not indignity, are concerned with operating in the present in ways that increase the probability that coming events will conform to their preference profile... If a large degree of freedom of communication is postulated as a long-run goal (as a partial realization of human dignity), scientific work can proceed by searching for the "myths" and "techniques" that work for or against freedom. All the available tools of theory formation, and of data gathering and processing, can be mobilized to accomplish the task.** If one applies that same principle to "scientific" journalism, it becomes both valueladen and fact-based. Lippmann had addressed Liberty and the News to those embracing "organized labor and militant liberalism."" He urged them to pay less attention to publishing "gallant little sheets expressing particular programmes"" and instead to join forces in creating a news service that would give the facts. "We shall advance...when we have learned to seek the truth, to reveal it and publish it; when we care more for that than for the privilege of arguing about ideas in a fog of uncertainty."''
This belieP in the power of objective fact to bring about social change is echoed in the closing passage of a 1924 book on journalistic ethics:
The process of attaining this condition of affairs (of testing opinions rather than preconceiving them) may not be a short one; it will doubtless seem unnecessarily long to those who believe that righteousness will immediately triumph if but given the aid of a few new laws or at most a new social and eco- when Public Opinion was published, Uppmann had lost some of his laith in the power of lact to ahape public opinion. Taking a Freudian view, Lippmann queatjoned the bet gathering and fact-using abilibea of cilizen«over-nora. and pointed out that the complexities of the modem world made it impossible for even the best fact-gatherer to be "eU veraed enough on issues to make sound deciaiona. Even so, his thoughts on the way journ^iais ahoukl do their job did not change. "is nothing but an organism that acts and reacts according to the sdmuli applied."" And a Methodist minister, saying that his generation wished to be free of dogmadsm, said that the past's great editors, such as Horace Greeley, "could not hold their reading public today any more than... Jonathan Edwards and Peter Cartwright could retain their parishioners."** 1929. A Kansas editor and lawmaker. Sen. Arthur Capper, told editors, "'It is not the dme for dogmatism or the closed mind. The old-dme editorial writer, however effective for another age, would not fit well."^* 1930. Ray Lyman Wilbur, secretary of the interior, told editors that in a complex, technological world, decisions must be made on the basis of fact, not emotion. "The quesdon is how are we going to train the people of a democracy so that they will look to the man who knows for decisions, rather than simply to someone who yells the loudest..."*Â pparendy, the repeated message had an effect. By 1931, Walter Uppmann, who had been serving as editor of the New York World, thought that journalism had changed dramatically -and in his opinion for the better. Writing in the Yale Review, he called the move toward objecdvity a "revolution:
The most impressive event of the last decade in the history of newspapers has been the demonstration that the objective, orderly, and comprehensive presentation of news is a far more successful type of journalism tCKlay than the dramatic, disorderly, episodic type"
The latter type, Uppmann argued, made newspapers the slave of the reader, adapdng copy to reach the highest circuladon figures. Because the new type of journalism seeks "the approximadon to objective fact, it is free also of subserviency to the whims of the public."
In the following passage, Lippmann sums up his idea of objective journalism, his hopes for it and the means for achieving it:
The strength of this type of journalism will, I think, be cumulative because it opens the door to the use of trained intelligence in newspaper work. I do not know much about the schools of journalism, and I cannot say, therefore, whether they are vocational courses designed to teach the unteachable art of the old romantic journalism or professional schools aiming somehow to prepare men for the new objective journalism. 1 suspect, however, that schools of journalism in the professional sense will not exist generally until journalism has been practiced for some time as a profession. It has never yet been a pro-fession. It has been at times a digniHed calling, at others a ronuntic adventure, and then again a servile trade. But a profession it could not begin to be until modern objective journalism was successfully created, and with it the need of men who would consider themselves devoted, as all the professional ideally are, to the service of truth alone." Clearly, Lippmann believed that journalistic practice had changed dramatically since the end of World War 1, and that the concept of scientific objectivity was a chief agent of that change. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of that view. Certainly change had occurred as journalists struggled to adapt from the Progressive Era with its moral certitude to an era when, in the words of Senator Capper, "uncertainties have replaced certainties" and "diversity and complexity have succeeded general optimism on religious, political, social, industrial, moral and economic questions."^'
In measuring the change, it must be remembered that when the decade began, many papers still aligned themselves with a political party and that almost all newspapers had policies -issue positions that were to be reflected in the news columns. As one writer and editor of that day observed, when Pulitzer's New York World took on an issue like the formation of the League of Nations, "Every department was called into action."" And Henry Watterson, editor oi Louisville Courier-Journal, wrote, "The leading dailies everywhere stand for something. They are rarely without aspirations."" As for party affiliation, as late as 1931, in an article titled "The Party Flag Comes Down," an author writes in wonder, "How strange a day it will be when this, oi all nations, finds the partisan newspaper the exception and no longer the rule! That day is coming though.""
With such examples, it can be shown that journalism norms were changing during the decade covered in this essay, and that the cultural climate had played a part in creating them. But an economic force was at work as well. It was in the 1920s that merger of newspapers began in earnest. Whereas only about 55% of American cities had only one daily in 1920, the figure had climbed to 71.5% by 1930." When a Republican and a Democratic paper in a city were merged, editors had to find a substitute for the partisan approach to journalism. The objective approach provided such an alternative.
But the Lippmann-espoused objectivity, which was seated in the broader cultural movement of scientific naturalism, was rigorous and difficult. By the time objectivity became enough a part of the working vocabulary of journalists to make its way into textbooks, its meaning was diluted. A 1935 text deals with the subject this way: "Reporters for the most part write entirely objectively and keep themselves and their opinions out of their stories."Ô bjectivity had shrunk from a methodology needed to preserve
